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ADJOINING LANDOWNERs-LATERAL SUPPORT-DAMIAGEs.-OAR v. DAY-
-TON & M. TPAcTi N Co., 96 N. E. (IND.), 462.-Held, that the damages
recoverable for the removal of the lateral support from land is the depre-
ciation in the value of the land; such damages being recoverable irrespec-
-tive of negligence.
The right to the lateral support of one's land in its natural condition
is universally conceded. Trowbridge v. True, 52 Conn., 190; Cabot v. King-
man, 166 Mass., 403; Farrand v. Marshall, 19 Barb. (N. Y.), 380. How-
ever, most Courts hold that no action lies for an injury to the right of
support until actual damage has occurred, the actionable wrong not being
the excavation, but the act of allowing the other's land to fall. Bonomi v.
Backhouse, El. BI. & El., 622; Schultz v. Bower, 57 Minn., 493; Smith v.
Seattle, 18 Wash., 484. Some Courts hold that the measure for damages
for the loss suffered is the cost of restoring the same to as good a condi-
tion as it was before the excavation was made. Stiminel v. Brown, 7
Houst., (Del.), 219. Other Courts hold that prospective damages may be
granted, the object being to consider the possible future damage that will
probably result from the excavation. Williams v. Missouri Furnace Co.,
13 Mo. App., 70; McGowan s. Bailey, 146 Pa., 572; Jones v. Seattle, 23
Wash., 753. In accord with the principal case, the measure of damages
as recognized by most Courts is the diminution in market value of the
injured property. Schroeder v. Joliet, 189 Ill., 48; Moellering v. Evans,
121 Ind., 195; McGuire v. Grant, 25 N. J. L., 356. And, moreover, the
right to damages is maintainable whether or not there was any negligence.
Foley v. Wyeth, 2 Allen (Mass.), 131; Ulrich v. Dakota L. & T. Co., 2
S. D., 285. As this applies only to land in its natural state, it does not
apply to lands burdened with buildings, and to recover for damage done
to such buildings by the removal of lateral support, it is necessary to show
,negligence. Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass., 199.
CONTRACTS-LEGALITY-RESTRAINT OF TRADE.-SMITH V. WEBB, 50
SOUTHERN, 913, ALABAMA.-Held, that an agreement by a vendor of a
business not to engage in a similar business in opposition to the vendee is
not void as being in restraint of trade, although not limited as to time of
.duration.
The weight of American authority is to the effect that agreements in
restraint of trade are valid if they are partial in their operation, based
upon valuable consideration, and reasonable and unoppressive in their
.conditions. Holmes v. Martin, 10 Ga., 503; Grasselli v. Lowden, 11 Ohio,
.349; Booth & Co. v. Siebold, 74 N. Y. S., 776. Thus where contracts are
limited as to time and place they will be deemed valid; Perkins v. Lyman,
.9 Mass., 522; Perkins v. Clay, 54 N. H., 518; but even where limited as
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to time and place contracts will be deemed void as in restraint of trade if
donditions ate such as will affect monopoly, stifle competition, or other-
wise operate against public policy. Western Wooden Ware Asso. v. Star-
key, 84 Mich., 76. Restriction as to place has been held in the United
States Courts not to mean within State boundaries; Oregon Steam Navi-
gation Co. '. Whinor, 87 U. S., 64; although the general rule is that restric-.
ttoti as to an entire State is void. Consuters Oil Co. v. Nunnentaker, 142
Ind., S60; P'aylor v. Blattehard, 95 Mass., 370. Agreements limiting as
to time and unlimited as to place are held valid if the conditions are
such as warrant such clauses, so that the party from whom the considera-
tion moves will not be prejudiced. Callahan v, Donnelly, 45 Cal., 152.
Where the contract is unlimited or indefinite as to time it will not be held
invalid if limited aa to location; Cook -v. Johnson, 47 Conn., 175; Smith v.
Btown, 164 Mass., 584; but where there was no limitation as to the time
in respect to a subject matter local in its nature, where limitation or non-
limitation as to extent of territory was necessary, it was held to be void
as in restraint of trade and against public policy. Ford v. Gregson, 7 Mont.,
89. Contracts in restraint of trade and unrestricted as to time and place
are void. Alger v. Thatcher, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.), 51; Albright v. Teas, 37
N. J. Eq. (10 Stew.), 171.
CONTRACTS-PARTIAS-PROMISP FOR I3PNEFIT Op THIRD PERSON.-SHEP-
PARD V. BRIDGES, ET AL., 74 S. E., (GA.), 245.-Held, that where one person
for a valuable consideration, agrees with another to pay the debts of the
latter, this alone does not authorize a creditor of the promisee to bring an
action at law against the promisor to recover the debt.
The English rule is that a stranger to the consideration can maintain
no action upon a contract; Crow v. Rogers, 1 Stra., 592; Price v. Easton.
4.B. & Ad., 433; and there is no exception made even in the case of par-
ties closely related. Gandy v. Gandy, 30 Ch. Div., 57. Early Massachu-
setts cases opposed the English doctrine; Felton v. Dickenson, 10 Mass.,
287; but later the English rule was adopted. Mellon v. Whipple, 1 Gray
(Mass.), 317; Marston v. Biglow, 150 Mass., 45. A few other States
favor the theory of the English decisions, Butter.field v. Hartshorn. 7
N H., 345; Crampton v. Ballard, 10 Ver., 251. The New York Courts.
however, early maintained the right of a third person to sue on the con-
tract, and this is the present weight of authority in this country. Mason v.
Hall, 30 Ala., 599; Lawrence v. Fo., 20 N. Y., 268. But even these Courts
hold such third person must have some legal or equitable interest in the
performance of the contract. Carter v. Darby, 15 Ala., 696; Lowe v.
Turpie, 147 Ind., 652. Virginia leaves the question still open. Willard v.
Worshant, 76 Va., 392; Jones v. Thomas, 21 Gratt. (Va.), 101. And in
Connecticut, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, though the general rule is there
regarded as the English rule, still the exceptions to it are so numerous
that in reality they rather follow the general American doctrine. Mech v.
Ensign, 49 Conn., 191; Seigman v. I4offacker, 57 Md., 321; Merriman v.
Moore, 90 Pa. St., 78.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CONSTRUCTION.-STATE V. MCCARTY, 59 SOUTH.,
543 (ALA.).-Held, that a constitution must be interpreted so as to carry
out the great principles of the government, and not be given any technical
construction winch will defeat them.
The terms construction and interpretation are used interchangebly in
the principal case. Interpretation differs from construction in this: that
interpretation is used for the purpose of ascertaining the true sense of
any form of words, while construction involves the drawing of conclu-
sions regarding subjects that are not always included in the direct ex-
pression. Bloomer v. Todd, 3 Wash. T., 612. In practice both terms are
frequently used synonymously. Bouvier Law Diet. The law as laid down
in the principal case does not consider the fundamental rules which govern
the construction of a constitution. The purpose, in construing a constitu-
tional provision, is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the people
in adopting it. Hills v. Chicago, 60 Ill., 86; Miller v. Dnmn, 72 Cal., 465;
Newall v. People, 7 N. Y., 97. The extremes of both a liberal and a strict
construction are to be avoided. Steamboat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cow. (N.
Y.), 713; State v. Ashley, 1 Ark., 513. The words used are presumed to
have been used in their ordinary and natural meaning. Gibbons v. Ogden,
9 Wheat. (U. S.), 1; Little v. Van Evrea, 49 N. Y., 281. The real inten-
tion, when once accurately ascertained, will prevail over the literal sense of
the terms employed in the instrument. District Tp. v. Dubuque, 7 Iowa,
262. Where both a technical and a popular -construction are possible the
latter prevails. Veill -e. Kenfield, 54 Cal., 111; People v. N. Y. Cent. R. R.
Co., 24 N. Y., 488. But where the words are borrowed from the common
law they retain their fixed technical meaning. Carpenter v. State, 4 How.
(Miss.), 166; McGuinnes v. State, 9 Humph. (Tenn.), 47.
CRI MINAL LAw-CoNDUCT OF TRIAL-ABSENCE OF JUDGE.-HUGHES V.
STATE, 149 S. W., 173 (TEx.).-Held, that the temporary absence of a
judge from the court room during the trial is not ground for a reversal
unless during his absence something occurs prejudicial to the accused.
Davidson, P. J., disscnting.
The weight of American authority sustains the proposition that there
can be no Court without a judge, and that it is his duty to be present dur-
ing all stages of the trial; People v. Blackburn, 127 Cal., 248; Turbesville
v. State, 56 Miss., 793; and that unless the parties consent to such act,
absence will be ground for reversal. Smith v. Sherwood, 95 Wis., 558;
State v. Snith, 49 Conn., 376. It has even been held that a judge must be
visibly present at all times; State v. Beuerman, 59 Kan., 586; People v.
Tupper, 122 Cal., 424; though there is some authority for the proposi-
tion that a judge may be out of sight but within hearing and so able to pass
on any question that may arise. Rowe v. People, 26 Colo., 542; State v.
Porter, 105 Iowa, 677. A judge, however, to avoid a reversal must
always be present during the summing up of counsel. Hayes v. State, 58
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Ga., 35; Patin v. State, 38 Neb., 862; Brownler v. Hewitt, 1 2\o. App., 360.
The case under discussion holding that prejudice during the absence
of a judge must be shown in order to constitute error, is supported by a
minority of authorities. Baxter t. Ray, 52 Iowa, 336. If counsel proceed
with their arguments after the judge's departure, though prejudice be
shown, no appeal will be allowed. Oakley v. Aspin-wall, 3 N. Y., 547.
Some States, also, adopt the view that if absence by the judge is not com-
plained of at the time, a new trial will not be granted. O'Shields Z. State.
81 Ga., 301; Pritchett v. State, 92 Ga., 301. The holding of the principal
case, though probably not in accord with the present numerical weight of
authority on this subject, is at least more in accord with common sense,
and seems to lay down a better rule.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-SALE WITHOUT LICENsE-BURDEN OF PROOF-
SALT LAKE CITY V. RoBiNSON, 125 PAC., 657 (UTAH).-Held, that the bur-
den is on one charged with selling intoxicants without a license to show
that he had a license to sell.
It is held in Kansas that where a defendant is prosecuted for selling
intoxicating liquor without a license the burden of proving a want of
license is upon the prosecution. State s. Kuthuke, 26 Kan., 405; State v.
Ne, 32 Kan., 201. In Wisconsin the doctrine is that, in such prosecution,
the State must produce some presumptive evidence that the defendant had
no license before he can be called upon to prove the contrary. Heplar v.
State, 58 Wis., 46; Mehan v. State, 7 Wis., 670. In two early cases the
Supreme Court of 'Massachusetts held that the prosecution must prove that
the accused had no license, and no presumption that he had none could
arise from the act of selling. Com. v. Livermore, 2 Allen (Mass.), 292;
Cont. v. Thurlow, 24 Pick. (Mass.), 374. Thereupon the legislature passed
an act that in all prosecutions for liquor selling the legal presumption
should be that the defendant had not been licensed, thus reversing what
had been held to be the Common Law rule in these two cases. This was
held to be within the powers of the legislature. Coin. v. Kelly, 10 Cush.,
69. An early case in North Carolina also held that the allegation of the
want of a license in a bill of indictment for selling spirituous liquor must
be proved on the part of the State. State v. Evans, 5 Jones' Rep. (N. C.),
250. But the generally established rule is stated by the main case. Cont.
v. Beloi, 115 Mass., 139; Jefferson v. People, 101 N. Y., 19; Lucio s,. State,
35 Tex. Crim., 320. Of course, the word burden, as used in the main
case, must be understood to mean merely the burden of proceeding; other-
wise it would be requiring the accused to establish his innocence, which
would be contrary to the notion of the Criminal Law which regards him
as innocent until proved guilty.
MANDAMUS-OFFICERS SUBJECT TO IANDAiMus-GENERAL COUNCIL OF
C1TY.-CITY OF PEDUCAH v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF PEDUCAH, 145
S. W., 1 (KY.).-Held, that where it is proper for the general council to
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apportion revenues, and include in their apportionment the amount to be
applied to school purposes, as provided by statute, any attempt to defeat
the legal demands of the board of education, either by insufficient appor-
tionment or by an insufficient levy. may be prevented by mandamus.
Municipal legislative bodies. like the superior legislative bodies of the
State government, in the performance of purely legislative functions, are
exempt from coercion by mandamus. Kennedy v. Washington, 3 Cranch
(C. C.), 595; Young v. Carey, 80 Ill. App., 601. But mandamus lies to
compel the proper authorities to perform their ministerial duties. People
Raymond, 186 Ill., 407; Polk v. James, 68 Ga., 128. Thus mandamus lies
to compel a city council to distribute and pay over the moneys apportioned
for school purposes; Hon v. State. 89 Ind.. 249; Plainfield Bd. of Educa-
tion z- Sheridan, 45 N. J. L., 276; Brown v. Nash, 1 Wyo., 85; and to
appropriate a sum of money for the maintenance of a public board when a
statute makes it their duty to do so. State v. Shakespeare, 41 La. Ann.,
156; Perkins v. Slack, 86 Pa. St.. 270. But where the authorities are vested
with exclusive discretionary powers in the disbursement and distribution
of school funds, or in appropriating money for school purposes mandamus
does not lie to compel their discretion. Newark v. Newark Bd. of Educa-
tion, 30 N. J. L., 374. So also the writ will not lie to compel an appro-
priation for school purposes unless the authorities having the power to
make the requisition therefor do so in the proper manner and at the proper
time. Con. v. Pittsbnrg, 209 Pa. St., 333.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs--PoWERS OF COUNCIL-RESOLUTIO.-LEVY
11T AL. V. CITY OF ELIZABETH, 80 ATL., 498 (N. J.).-Held, that a municipal
charter conferring on the cotncil power to "make, establish, publish and
modify, amend or repeal ordinances, rules, regulations, and by-laws" for
certain specified purposes, gives no power to the council to act in that
regard by resolution, but only by ordinance.
Legislative and permanent acts regulating the affairs of a municipal
c :orporation should be in the form of ordinances and not in the form of
resolutions. Cascaden v. WTatcrloo. 106 Iowa, 673; Central v. Sears, 2 Colo.,
588. A resolution is sufficient for the promulgation of ministerial acts.
Bianchard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St., 96. An ordinance may, however, be in
the form of a resolution and will generally be valid if enacted with all the
formalities which are required by law for the enactment of ordinances.
Sower s. Philadelphia, 35 Pa. St., 231; Alna v. Guaranty Savings Bank,
19 U. S. App., 622. In such cases, however, it has been held that there
must be an affirmative showing that the concomitant formalities of an ordi-
nance, as regards its approval and subsequent publication, were observed
to establish the validity of the resolution as an ordinance. Wheeler v. City
of Poplar Bluff, 149 Mo., 36. But where the charter confers upon a city
council power to regulate by ordinance, a like power to regulate by reso-
lution is not to be implied, and such resolutions will be null and void.
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Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Chicago, 174 Ill., 439; Mills v. City of San Antonio,
65 S. W., 1121; City of Nevada v. Eddy, 123 Mo., 546. Nor can an ordi-
nance be repealed or modified by resolution, unless the substance of the
ordinance is such that it originally might have been given valid effect if
put in the form of a resolution. San Antonio v. Micklejohn, 89 Tex., 79.
The reasoning of these cases, though not directly touching upon the iden-
tical proposition of the principal case, tends to confirm the soundness of
its holding, and makes more plain the tendency of the Courts to regard
proceeding by resolution on the part of a city council as ineffectual when
the charter can be understood in any reasonable way as calling for pro-
ceeding by ordinance.
OFFICERS-APPOINTMIENT-REMOVAL-POWER OF GOVERNOR.-STATE V.
RHAME, 75 S. E., 881 (S. C.).-Held, that the power of removal from office
by the Governor is not incident to the power of appointment where the
term of office is fixed by statute. Watts, J., and Gage, Cir. 3., dissenting.
It may be stated generally, that where the power of appointment is
conferred in general terms and without restriction, the power of removal.
in the discretion and at the will of the appointing power, is implied and
always exists unless restrained and limited by some provision of law.
Pcople v. Robb, 126 N. Y., 180; -lonseman v. Cont., 100 Pa., 222; Town of
Davis v. Filler, 47 W. Va., 413. By other Courts the proposition is stated
that where the tenure of office is not fixed by law, and no other provision
is made for removals either by the Constitution or by statute, "it is a sound
and necessary rule to consider the power of removal as incident to the
power of appointment." E.v parte Henan, 13 Peters (U. S.), 230; Patton
v Vaughan, 30 Ark., 211; State v. Dahl, "140 Wis., 301. The power of
arbitrary removal is to be limited to these circumstances, however, and if
the tenure is fixed by law, the appointing power cannot arbitrarily remove
him. Collins v. Tracy, 36 Tex., 546; Pcople v. Hill, 7 Cal., 97; State v.
Chatburn, 63 Ia., 659. A general power to remove cannot be implied as a
consequence of the power to appoint where the statute gives express
authority to remove on certain specific grounds. People v. Treas. of Ingham
County, 36 Mich., 416. Nor can it be implied where the power of appoint-
ment by one person is dependent on the precedent or concurrent actions of
other persons. Carr v. State, 111 Ind., 101. The power of amotion from
office is not a judicial but an administrative power although it be exercised
in a judicial manner. State v. Dahl, 140 Wis., 301. It may be vested else-
where than in the appointing power; People v. McAllister, 10 Utah, 357;
and it may be vested in the Governor alone although the appointment is
made by and with the consent of the Senate. Wilcox v. People, 90 Ill.,
196. It is a common provision of State governments that the Governor
shall have the power to remove for cause not only appointive but elective
officers, and this is clearly within the authority of the sovereign powcr.
People v. Whitlock, 92 N. Y., 191. In the case of the President of the
United States it has been held that by reason of the construction placed by
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Congress upon the Constitution, he is to be regarded as possessing the
pcwer to remove an officer appointed by him and confirmed by the Senatej
who by law has a fixed term. Parson v. United States, 167 U. S., 324. Aiid
a similar rule has been announced as to the power of the Governor ufider
certain State Constitutions. Harman v. Harwood, 58 Md., 1. Yet the
holding of the principal case is supported by the clear weight of authoiity;
People v. lewett, 6 Cal., 291;- Bruce v. Maftlock, 86 Ark., 555; Territory v.
A -fshenfelter, 5 N. M., 85; despite the fact that we have the anomalous
situation of (in the words of one of the dissenting judges) "the created
being greater than the creator".
RAPE-EVIDENcE-CHARACTER oF FEMALE.-STRY V. STATE, 59 Sou.,
480 (ALA.).-Held, that in prosecutions for rape, where nonconsent is an
,element of the offense, and in which the chastity of the woman may be
brought into question, the character of the prosecutrix may be impeached,
but by evidence of her reputation in that respect only, and not by proof of
specific acts.
The weight of American authority is in accord with the case under
discussion and holds that want of chastity on the part of the prosecutrix
in an action of rape must be shown by general reputation and not by proof
of specific acts. Pleasant v. State, 15 Ark., 624; Comm. v. Regan, 105 Mass.,
393. And evidence of such reputation must be confined to the time prior
to the alleged rape. State v. McDonotugh, 104 Iowa, 6; State v. Forshener,
43 N. H., 89. There is, however, this exception to the general rules that
individual acts with the defendant, prior to the alleged crime, inay be
proved, as it tends to show consent; People v. Mathe-ws, 139 Cal., 527;
State v. Cook, 65 Iowa, 560; and that general immoral character and habits
of the prosecutrix may be produced in evidende to the extent of showing
that she was a common prostitute. Brown v. State, 72 Miss., 997; Titus v.
State, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.), 132. In some States, however, it is held that
the question of character may be affected by specific acts of intercourse,
if proven, though committed with other persons than the defendant;
People v. Benson, 6 Cal., 221; Brown v. Comm., 102 Ky., 227 (over-
ruling, 93 Ky., 578); People v. Abbot, 19 Wend. N. Y., 192; State v.
Patterson, 88 Mo., 88 (overruling, St. v. Brassfield, 81 Mo., 151); and
that the prosecutrix may be compelled to answer on cross-examina-
tion as to whether she had intercourse with another at or about or
before the time of the act alleged. State v. Hollenbeck, 67 Vt., 34. It
seems a harsh rule to allow evidence of past immoral acts to be intro-
duced in such a'case, without taking circumstances into consideration.
If a woman should reform and become of such good character that her
later seduction would furnish grounds for an action for rape, she then
being chaste in contemplation of law, State v. Thornton, 108 Mo., 640; Pat-
terson -'. Hayden, 18 Iowa, 372; evidence of her immoral acts before her
reformation should not be admitted. The principal case lays down the
better and more generally accepted rule on this subject.
